Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian
Philosophers
Volume 4

Issue 3

Article 8

7-1-1987

Middle Knowledge and Human Freedom: Some Clarifications
David Basinger

Follow this and additional works at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy

Recommended Citation
Basinger, David (1987) "Middle Knowledge and Human Freedom: Some Clarifications," Faith and
Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian Philosophers: Vol. 4 : Iss. 3 , Article 8.
DOI: 10.5840/faithphil19874328
Available at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy/vol4/iss3/8

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative
exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian
Philosophers by an authorized editor of ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative exchange.

MIDDLE KNOWLEDGE AND HUMAN FREEDOM:
SOME CLARIFICATIONS
David Basinger

The concept of middle knowledge-God's knowledge of what would in fact happen in
every conceivable situation-is just beginning to receive the attention it deserves, For
example, it is just now becoming clear to many that classical theism requires the affirmation
of middle knowledge. But this concept is also coming under increasing criticism. The
most significant of these, I believe, has been developed in a recent discussion by William
Hasker, in which he argues that the concept of a true counterfactual of freedom is
incoherent. I also believe, however, that his critique ultimately fails and specify why in
the essay which follows.

To say that God is omniscient, most theistic philosophers and theologians agree,
is to say that God knows all true propositions and none that are false-i.e., God
knows all that is knowable. But exactly what is knowable? Most agree that those
propositions describing what is (or has been) actual and that which will with
certainty follow from what is actual are true and thus known by God to be true.
And, traditionally, most have also held that God has simple foreknowledge. That
is, they have believed that those propositions describing what will actually occur,
including what humans will freely choose to do, are true now and thus are also
known to be so by God.
But what of counterfactual knowledge? What, for example, should be said
about the following statement: "If Ted Kennedy had won the Presidential election
in 1980, he would have run again in 1984." The antecedent is false, so the
statement cannot be true (and thus knowable) by virtue of the fact that it describes
what has occurred or will actually occur. But is it not either true or false that if
Kennedy had won in 1980, he would have run again? And, thus, ought we not
maintain that God knows that truth or falsity of such hypothetical conditionals?
There are some respected philosophers such as Alvin Plantinga who claim
that God does indeed have such 'middle knowledge'. But recently a number of
other philosophers have been challenging this contention. One of the most significant of these challenges has come from William Hasker. J In fact, I believe
Hasker offers the strongest challenge to middle knowledge to date. I shall argue,
however, that his critique ultimately fails.
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I

Hasker focuses his discussion on counterfactuals of freedom such as the following:
(1) If Elizabeth were offered a grant, she would accept it.
(2) If Elizabeth were offered a grant, she would reject it.

Most critics of middle knowledge, he points out, attack the assumption that, for
any pair of counterfactuals such as (1) and (2), one is true and the other false.
They argue either that both are false or that neither has at present any truth value.
But Hasker doesn't believe such critics have been successful so he adopts a
different strategy. He invites us to assume for the sake of discussion that some
countelfactuals of freedom are true and then raises the following question: Who
or what (if anything) brings it about that these propositions are true?
It cannot be God, he argues. For if God is the one who makes it the case that
agents would respond in certain ways under certain circumstances, then it is
hard to avoid the conclusion that in such circumstances such agents would not
be free. Nor, Hasker believes, can it be the agent who makes these propositions
true. Some proponents of MK, he acknowledges, do believe that it is the agent
who brings about the truth of counterfactuals in those possible worlds in which
the antecedent is true. However, once we properly understand what it means for
one proposition to be "true independently of " the truth of another proposition
and apply this analysis to the case at hand, he argues, we see that the truth of
all counterfactuals in all possible worlds is independent ofthe action of the agent.
But, if the truth of all counterfactuals of freedom is independent of the action
of the agent, Hasker continues, then what do the agents in such counterfactuals
really have it in their power to d<r-e.g., what does Elizabeth really have it in
her power to do when the grant is offered? To make this detennination, we are
told, we must consider two 'power entailment' principles, principles which
Hasker believes to be quite obviously correct:
(3)
(4)

If it is in A's power to bring it about that P, and "P" entails "Q" and
"Q" is false, then it is in A's power to bring it about that Q.
If it is in A's power to bring it about that P, and "P" entails "Q," then
either it is in A's power to bring it about that Q, or the truth of "Q"
is a necessary condition of A's having the power to bring it about that P.

But (3) and (4), he believes, spell doom for the concept of a true counterfactual
of freedom. Utilizing Elizabeth's case again, his basic line of reasoning runs as
follows. If we assume that Elizabeth will accept the grant if it is offered and
then ask whether it is in her power to reject the offer, then in tenns of (3) and
(4), "A," "P" and "Q" become the following:
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A = Elizabeth
P = Elizabeth rejects the grant.
Q = If Elizabeth is offered the grant, she will reject it.

But when we plug these values into (3) and (4), we quickly see that Elizabeth
does not have it in her power to reject the offer. For given (3), if it is in A's
(Elizabeth's) power to bring it about that P (to reject the offer) and "Q" is false
(if she will in fact accept the grant offered), then it must be in A's power to
bring it about that Q. And it has already been shown that no agent has it in her
power to bring it about that any counterfactual of freedom is true. Thus, given
(4), it can only be in A's (Elizabeth's) power to bring it about that P (to reject
the offer) if the truth of "Q" is a necessary condition of A's (Elizabeth's) having
the power to bring it about that P (to reject the offer). But "Q" is in fact false
in this case. So we must conclude that it is not in Elizabeth's power to reject
the grant. And if it is not in her power to reject the grant, if offered, then she
cannot be said to be free with respect to the offer in question.
From this it follows, Hasker then concludes, that "the concession made earlier--that some counterfactuals of freedom are true-was unwarranted .... Insofar
as such counterfactuals are true, they are not counterfactuals of freedom .... And
on the other hand insofar as the agent is genuinely free there are no true counterfactuals stating what that agent would definitely do under various possible
circumstances. And so the doctrine of middle knowledge is seen to be untenable:
There are no true counteifactuals of freedom. "2
II

I applaud Hasker's approach. I believe that attempts to demonstrate that all
counterfactuals of freedom are either false or have no truth value will never be
totally convincing. Thus, it seems to me that only those like Hasker who attempt
to demonstrate that such counterfactuals are incoherent pose a real threat to
middle knowledge.
Moreover, I agree that if counterfactuals of freedom are true, this is not so
because of anything God or human agents have done. And finally, I agree that
if we accept (3) and (4) in their present state, then it is the case that there are
no true counterfactuals of freedom.
But ought we accept (3) and (4)? Are these power entailment principles such
that "a little thought will show [them] to be correct?,,3 At one level they are
perfectly acceptable. Consider, for instance, the two test cases offered by Hasker:
A = You
P ,= You see the sunrise.

A= I
P = Iring your doorbell.
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Q = The sun is in fact now rising.

333

Q = You now have a doorbell.

It certainly seems correct to say, given (3), that if it is in my power to ring your

doorbell, and ringing your doorbell entails that you now have a doorbell and it
is false that you now have a doorbell, then it must be in my power to bring it
about that you now have a doorbell. And it certainly seems correct to say, given
(4), that if you have it in your power to see the sunrise, and your seeing a sunrise
entails that the sun is rising, then it is either in your power to bring it about that
the sun is rising or the fact that the sun is now rising is a necessary condition
of your having the power to see the sun.
Moreover, there is a sense in which the proponent of middle knowledge will
have no problem with (3) and (4). Let us again consider (1) and (2). Given, (3)
and (4), (1) and (2) become the following:
A = Elizabeth
P = Elizabeth accepts the grant.
Q = The grant is offered.

A = Elizabeth
P = Elizabeth rejects the grant.
Q = The grant is offered.

And the proponent of middle knowledge will certainly not deny that if Elizabeth
has it in her power to bring it about that she accepts or rejects the grant, then
either she can bring it about that the grant is offered or the offering of the grant
is a necessary condition for her having the power to bring it about that the grant
is accepted or rejected.
The problem for middle knowledge arises when "Q" becomes the counterfactual
of freedom itself. But when considered in this context, it is no longer so obvious
that (3) and (4) are acceptable. Let us consider Hasker's doorbell example in
this light. If we assume that I will ring the doorbell if the opportunity presents
itself and then ask whether it is in my power to refrain from ringing the doorbell,
then in terms of (3) and (4), "A," "P" and "Q" become the following:
A = I
P = I refrain from ringing the doorbell.
Q = If presented with the opportunity to ring the doorbell, I will refrain
from doing so.
Now, if we accept (3), then, given that "Q" is false, it is in my power to refrain
from ringing the doorbell only if it is in my power to bring it about that "Q" is
true. But I have already granted that agents cannot bring about the tntth of
counterfactuals of freedom. Thus, ifwe accept (4), it can only be in my power
to refrain from ringing the doorbell if the truth of "Q" is a necessary condition
for my having the power to refrain from ringing the doorbell. But "Q" is false;
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I have no such power and, hence, am not free to bring it about that P.
However, need the proponent of middle knowledge accept (3) and (4)? It
seems to me not. Consider, for example, the following variations of these principles:
(3') If it is in A's power to bring it about that P and "P" entails "Q"
and "Q" is false, then it is in A's power to act in such a manner
that, if she were to act in that fashion, "Q" would be (would always
have been) true.
(4') If it is in A's power to bring it about that P, and "P" entails "Q,"
then either it is in A's power to act in such a way that if she were
to act in that way, "Q" would be (would always have been) true
or the truth of"Q" is a necessary condition of A's having the power
to bring it about that P.
(3') and (4') are identical to (3) and (4) except for the substitution of the phrase
"then it is in A's power to act in such a manner that, if she were to act in that
manner "Q" would be (would always have been) true" for the phrase "then it is
in A's power to bring it about that Q."
But this substitution is crucial for the concept of middle knowledge. (3) and
(4) are incompatible with middle knowledge, remember, because they stipulate
that when "P" entails "Q" and "Q" is false, the agent can only be said to have
it in her power to bring it about that P if she can bring it about that Q, which
she in fact cannot do. In other words, (3) and (4) are incompatible with middle
knowledge because they stipulate in this context that a person can only be said
to be acting freely if she has it in her power to do the impossible: namely, bring
it about that a counterfactual of freedom is true.
But (3') and (4') circumvent this problem. A necessary relationship between
"Q" and A's action is retained. But (3') and (4') do not require that A have it
(or even have ever had it) in her power to bring it about that a counterfactual
("Q") is true before it can be said that she has it in her power to bring it about
that P. (3') and (4') only require that A have it in her power to do something,
such that, if she were to do it, the relevant counterfactual of freedom would as
a matter of fact be (have been) true. For example, to return to our doorbell
scenario, while (3) and (4) stipulate that if I have it in my power to refrain from
ringing the doorbell, then I must have it in my power to bring it about that the
proposition "Q"-if presented with the opportunity to ring the doorbell, I will
refrain from doing so-is true, (3') and (4') make no such demand. These revised
principles only require that I have it in my power to refrain from ringing the
doorbell-i.e., to bring it about that the proposition "P"-I refrain from ringing
the doorbell-is true. (3') and (4') then simply add that if I were to choose to
act in this manner, "Q" would be (would always have been) true. And all this,
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of course, is perfectly compatible with middle knowledge.
But are (3') and (4') acceptable substitutions for Hasker's (3) and (4)7 Since
his power entailment principles only differ from mine when "Q" is false, his
sunrise illustration is clearly unaffected. And his 'simple' doorbell illustration
also appears to be unaffected. Given (3), we have:
If I have it in my power to ring your doorbell, and ringing your doorbell
entails that you now have a doorbell and you don't now have a doorbell,
then I have it in my power to bring it about that you now have a doorbell.

Given (3') we have:
If I have it in my power to ring your doorbell, and ringing your doorbell
entails that you now have a doorbell and you don't now have a doorbell,
then I have it in my power to act in such a manner that if I were to act
in that manner, it would be true that you now have a doorbell.

Now, of course, (3') is a bit more cumbersome than (3), but they both come to
the same thing. Either I try something exotic in both cases~.g., 1 claim that
by petitioning divine intervention, I can bring it about that you now have a
doorbell, or I admit in both cases that I can't do anything which will instantaneously produce a doorbell and thus that I don't have the power to ring the doorbell
under the stated conditions.
However, in relation to the 'counterfactual' doorbell example, (3) and (3')
clearly do not come to the same thing. Given (3), A has the power to bring it
about that P only if A has the power to bring it about that "Q" is true, while,
given (3'), A has the power to bring it about that P only if A can bring it about
that "P" is true (which would then make it the case independently that "Q" is
true). In short, given (3'), the stipulated condition in question becomes tautological-i.e., A has it in her power to bring it about that P only if she has it in her
power to bring it about that P-while given (3), this is not the case.
But I do not see how this fact alone counts against (3'). For why should we
assume that A must meet some other condition~.g., must be able to bring it
about that "Q" is true-before she has it in her power to bring it about that P.
It is surely not because our common understanding of what it means for an agent
to be free with respect to an action leads us to this conclusion. It seems to me
just the opposite is true: To be free does not appear to require more than that
we be able to make the relevant choice. The only reason I can see for holding
that A's ability to bring it about that Q is a necessary condition for her having
the power to bring it about that P is that (3), and thus (4), requires it. But (3'),
as we have seen, is every bit as discriminating as (3) when "Q" isn't itself a
hypothetical conditional of freedom. Thus, I see no reason to pick (3) over (3')
in relation to hypothetical conditionals unless one already believes that counter-

Faith and Philosophy

336

factuals of freedom are nonsense or must be made true by the actions of the
agents involved. And, accordingly, it seems to me that to choose (3) over (3'),
and thus (4) or (4'), is in the last analysis simply to share one's perspective on
the middle knowledge debate. But if this is so, then the proponent of middle
knowledge need not be bothered. She already knows others disagreed with her
perspective. What she is waiting for is some conclusive argument against her
position, an argument which I do not think Hasker provides.

NOTES
1. William Hasker, "A Refutation of Middle Knowledge," Nous (December, 1986): p. 545-57.
2. Hasker, p. 556.
3. Hasker, p. 553-54.

